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TORTS-DAMAGES FOR FRIGHT
Within the past few years there has been a revival of
interest in the problem which can best be illustrated by the ques-
tion: Should damages be awarded to a plaintiff who has suffered
injuries ensuing from fright, without impact, occasioned by the
defendant's negligent conduct? There are, of course, variant
phases of this general question and any attempt to examine all
of them thoroughly and exhaustively in one article would be
ridiculous. Therefore the mriter will limit his discussion to a
critique of several of the more salient factors in this broad field
after reviewing various authorities.
In the same year, i. e., 1888, decisions were handed down
for the first time in England and America denying recovery
for physical injuries due to fright without impact.1 Each court
rested its decision upon the hackneyed refuge of a decrepit
jurisprudence-lack of precedent. One English justice added:
"The difculty which now exists in case of alleged physical
injuries of determining whether they were caused by the negli-
gent act would be greatly increased, and a wide field opened for
imaginary claims."
Early decisions granted substantial damages in a class of
torts such as assault without physical impact, where the only
direct injury was mental,2 and it is therefore difficult to under-
stand how, when the question of allowing damages for mental
pain came directly before the courts, these previous cases were
entirely overlooked and the courts assumed that injury resulting
from fright was not a proper subject for compensation. Prob-
ably the most plausible reason is offered by Sedgwick:3 "this
opinion apparently arose from a misconception of Lord Wens-
leydale's meaning in the case of Lynch v. Kuight4 where he
said: 'lental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does
not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of
causes that alone; though where a material damage occurs, and
1 Victorian Ry. Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 A. C. 222 (1888);
Lehman v. The Brooklyn City Ry. Co., 47 Hun. 355 (1888).
2Mortin v. Shoppee, 3 C. & P. 373, 172 Eng. Rep. 462 (1828);
Bandy v. Johnson, 5 Md. 450 (1854).
'Sedgwick, Damages (8th ed. 1891), Sec. 43.
'9 H. L. Cas. 577, 598 (1861).
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is connected with it, it is impossible a jury in estimating
it, should altogether overlook the feelings of the party in-
terested.' Taking this language in connection with the facts of
the case, the meaning is clear. The case was an action of
slander, brought for an imputation on plaintiff's chastity; and
the decision was that such an imputation was not actionable
without special damage, and that mental pain alone is not such
special damage. No question of the measure of damage was
under consideration, and the opinion is no authority for the
proposition that mental suffering as the result of actionable
wrong is not in any case a proper subject for compensation."
Two years later the doctrine laid down in the Coultas case5
was repudiated by the Irish courts with the case of Bell v. Great
Northern Ry. of Ireland,s and it was questioned in later English
decisions, 7 but not expressly overruled since there was a dis-
crepancy in the facts.
Dudieu v. White & Sons8 expressly repudiated the (oultas
case9 and along with Coyle v. Watson'0 settled the law in Eng-
land. Scotland followed with Gilligan v. Robb.." thus assuring
recovery in England, Scotland, and Ireland for injuries result-
ing from fright without impact.
The American jurisdictions have consistently been in con-
ffict on this question. The first case to be decided after the
Lehman case' 2 arose in Texas and recovery was allowed;13 the
Pennsylvania court of appeals two years later refused re-
covery ;14 but in the same year recovery was allowed in Minne-
sota.1 5 It is in this fashion that the American jurisdictions
5 Victorian Ry. Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 A. C. 222 (1888).
6 26 Ir. L. R. 428 (1890).
"Wilkinson v. Downton (1897), 2 Q. B. 57; Pugh v. London, Etc.,
Ry. Co. (1896), T Q. B. 248.
8 (1901), 2 K. B. 669.
S1upra, note 5.
IOLord Atkinson: "But in England, in Scotland, and in Ireland
alike the authority of Victorian Ry. Commissioners v. Coultas has
been questioned, and, to speak quite frankly has been denied. I am
humbly of the opinion that the case can no longer be treated as a de-
cision of guiding authority." (1915), A. C. 1.
"(1910), S. C. 856.
22Hupra, note 1.
"Hall v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S. W. 59 (1890).
'
4 Ewing v. Pittsburgh, Etc., R. Co., 147 Pa. St. 40, 23 Atl. 340
(1892).
1Purcell v. St. Paul, Etc., Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 00 N. W. 1034
(1892).
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liave -*eie d this question, with the tendency, however, for those
states allowing recovery to predominate. 16 Kentucky follows
those jurisdictions refusing recovery.' 7
The courts in the early cases gave as their reason for deny-
ing recovery that there was no precedent, 18 but this is, of course,
no reason at all, and if given universal application would put
an end to all growth or progress of the law through judicial
decision.' 9
The other reasons assigned by the courts denying recovery
are: 1. Since fright caused by negligence does not give a
cause of action, injury resulting from such fright is not action-
able ;20 2. Damages for fright are too remote ;21 3. It is against
public policy to allow such recovery.
22
It would seem tfiat the first of these reasons may be dis-
missed because it is a non sequitur. While it is admitted that
fright alone will not ground an action for damages De minimis
non cwrat lex, does it necessarily follow that because the law
does not recognize a duty to refrain from causing a mere emo-
tional disturbance, thie causing of physical injury by negligence
should not be actionable simply because fright is the means by
which the injury is produedY As pointed out by Throckmor-
ton :23 "The essential thing is the existence of the link in the
chain of causation, not the character of that link"
"Mack v. South Bend Ry. Co., 5Z S. C. 323, 29 S. E. 905 (1897);
Ala. Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916);
Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 Pac. 440 (1918); Watson v.
Dilts, 116 Iowa 249, 89 N. W. 1068 (1902); Whitsell v. Watts, 98 Kan.
508, 159 Pac. 401 (1916). Contra: McGee v. Vanover, 148 Ky. 737, 147
S. W. 742 (1912); Spade v. Lynn, Etc., R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E.
88 (1897); Miller v. Baltimore & 0. S. W. R. Co., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85
N. E. 499 (1908).
"I Smith v. Gowdy, 196 Ky. 281, 244 S. W. 698, 29 A. L. R. 1353
(1922); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Roberts, 207 Ky. 310, 269
S. W. 333 (1925); Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's
Guardian, 232 Ky. 285, 23 S. W. (2d) 272 (1929); Covington Street
Ry. Co. v. Parker, 72 Ky. 455, 15 Am. Rep. 725 (1872).
" 
8Supra, note L
2 Throckmorton, "Damages for Fright" (1921), 34 Harv. L. Rev.
260.
"Mitchell v. Rochester R. Co., 151 X. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896);
Memphis St. R. Co. v. Bernstein, 137 Tenn. 637, 194 S. W. 902 (1917).
"'Kansas City Rty. Co. v. Dalton, 65 Kan. 661, 70 Pac. 645 (1902);
Ward v. West Jersey, Etc., R. Co., 65 N. J. L. 383, 47 Atl. 561 (1900).
2Mitchell v. Rochester R. Co., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896);
Ewing v. Pittsburgh, Etc., R. Co., 147 Pa. St. 40, 23 Atl. 340 (1892).
Throckmorton, supra, note 19.
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Sir Richard Couch stated in the Coultas case24 the second
reason for denying recovery: "Damages arising from mere
sudden terror unaccompanied by any actual physical injury,
but occasioning a nervous or mental shock, cannot, under such
circumstances, their Lordships think, be considered a conse-
quence which, in the ordinary course of things, would flow from
the negligence. . . ." It would seem that those cases which
use the "remoteness" argument have falsely assumed that any
damages may be too remote which flow in an unbroken chain
of causation. But the better definition of remoteness is that
expressed by Kennedy, J. :25 "Remoteness as a legal ground for
the exclusion of damage in an action of tort means, not sever-
ance in point of time, but the absence of direct and natural
causal sequence-the inability to trace in regard to the damage
the propter hoc in a necessary or natural descent from the
wrongful act. As a matter of experience, I should say that the
injury to health which forms the main ground of damages in
actions of negligence, . . frequently is proved, not as
a concomitant of the occurence but as one of the sequelae."
The absurdity of the rule denying recovery for personal
injuries resulting from fright alone on the ground that the
damage is too remote, is aptly illustrated by the fact that many
of those courts denying recovery for injury resulting from
fright alone authorize a recovery for injury resulting from
fright which was accompanied by a slight impact which in itself
caused little or no injury.20 An impact means almost anything:
for example, dust in the eyes,2 7 or a forcible seating on the
floor.2 8 "The magic formula 'impact' is pronounced; the door
opens to the full joy of a complete recovery."2 9 Surely it is
no more difficult to trace the chain of causation in a case where
there is no impact than in the cases where the impact is so trival
as to often cause not the slightest mark or blemish on the person
of the plaintiff. Take as an example a case where the injured
4 Supra, note 5.
2Dulieu v. White & Sons (1901), 2 K. B. 669, 678.
-"McGee v. Vanover, 148 Ky. 737, 147 S. W. 742 (1912); Porter v.
Del., Etc., R. Co., 73 N. J. L. 405, 63 AtL 860 (1906); Smith v. Mont-
clair Cab Co., 6 N. J. Misc. 57, 139 At. 904 (1928).
"Porter v. Del., Etc., R. Co., supra, note 26.
"Driscoll v. Gaffey, 207 Mass. 102, 92 N. E. 1010 (1910).
2'Goodrich, "Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage" (1921),
20 Mich. L. Rev. 497, 504.
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party is a pregnant woman who contends, in asking for damages,
that she was frightened by the defendant's negligent conduct
and as a result suffered a miscarriage. 30 In such a case it would
not be at all difficult for the medical profession to trace in an
unbroken line the various physiological changes ensuing from
the fright, and to determine a definite link connecting the negli-
gent frightening and the resulting injury.3 '
The third reason for denying recovery is that it is contrary
to public policy since to do so would flood the courts with litiga-
tion and tend to promote fraud; and further, such damages
would be difficult if not impossible of assessment. 32 Perhaps
the best answer to the former of these arguments is the fact that
in those states which have allowed recovery for physical in-
juries caused by fright there has been no substantial increase
in litigation. But, granting that it would tend to increase liti-
gation, since the fundamental policy of the law is to redress
wrong surely public policy would not conflict with a doctrine
allowing recovery merely because it tended to increase litigation.
It is submitted that the mere fact of increased litigation in cer-
tain fields has not prompted legislatures and couits to abolish
or restrict those fields. Rather, they have extended them.
The danger of exposing the courts to fraudulent claims
should not deter them from expanding the law where such ex-
pansion makes for the common good. A day scarcely passes
that a busy court is not met with fraud in one of its kaleidoscopid
variations. In such instances should our judges, like the pro-
verbial ostrich, stick their heads in the sands of some archaic
precedent and refuse to grant relief ? It would be far better to
first junk our legal system. Whether or not a claim is fraudu-
lent is a matter of proof; if physical injuries resulting from
fright are easily simulated, then that fact should be addressed
to our juries-they are our fact-finding bodies.33  There are
effective procedures which have been established for the purpose
"The writer finds that a large proportion of the "fright" cases
involve a like situation.
'Howell, A Text-Book of Physiology (12th ed. 1933), 1064. "In
women it is known that delivery may be precipitated prematurely by
various mental . . . disturbances."
"Victorian Ry. Commissioners v. Coultas, supra, note 1; Mitchell
Y. Rochester Ry. Co., supra, note 20.
" Ala. Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 321, 73 So.
205 (1916).
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of ascertaining the existence of real injuries, and the idea that
an award of damages in a given field would open the door to
fraud has never precluded such an allowance in proper cases.3 4
The argument that damages for injuries resulting from
fright are difficult of assessment is based upon the idea of' the
incapacity of the jury to determine the proper amount of re-
covery for such injuries. But the primary function of the jury
is to sift evidence, find facts, and from those facts determine the
proper compensation in money. Is such a determination in
fright cases any more difficult than in assault,3 5 in defamation, 0
in malicious prosecution,3 7 in wrongful arrest,3 8 in seduction,3"
and in unlawful search and seizure4 ° where recovery has been
allowed. The problem resolves itself into the task of tracing
the chain of causation from the fright to the ultimate physical
injury. If damages can be allowed for injuries resulting from
nervous shock when accompanied by impact, surely the absence
of impact makes such damage no more difficult of assessment.
Although the jurisdictions are by no means in accord with the
doctrine allowing recovery in these cases, the number of courts
denying recovery is gradually diminishing in the face of im-
proved techniques in the fields of physiology, pathology, and
psychology. 41 And these techniques and methods have made
such rapid strides in the past few years that it now remains for
the courts to accept or reject the "recovery" doctrine which,
it is submitted, goes hand in hand with an advancing and more
enlightened jurisprudence.
ALBERT R. JoNns.
""We need not be duly alarmed that a wider protection to the
feelings will open up the flood gates of litigation to redress all petty
annoyances. The courts will be guided by the same good sense that
aids them in drawing distinctions in the nuisance cases. It is not
every smell, every racket, that constitutes a nuisance. So it would not
be every emotional upset that need constitute the basis of a law suit."
Goodrich, supra, note 29, at 512.
35McKinley v. C. & N. W. R. Co., 44 Iowa 314 (1876).
Swift v. Dickerman, 31 Conn. 285 (1863).
Parkhurst v. Mastellar, 57 Iowa 474, 10 N. W. 864 (1881).
"Young v. Gormley, 120 Iowa 372, 94 N. W. 922 (1903).
0Hawn v. Banghart, 76 Iowa 372, 39 N. W. 251 (1888).
4U. S. F. & G. Co. v. Miss., 121 Miss. 369, 83 S. 610 (1920).
"Pound, "Interests of Personality" (1915), 28 Harv. L. Rev. 343,
